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The study compares the labor market experience of men with disabilities before and after the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990. The handful of studies that have focused on the wage impact of disabilities 
have either not fully incorporated the probability of employment into the analysis or have not correctly 
decomposed the wage differences in light of selectivity corrections.  After estimating a two-stage model of 
the probability of employment followed by a wage equation for men with and without disabilities, I use 
Newman and Oaxaca‟s (2004) method to correctly decompose the distributions. In addition, I also perform 
a similar analysis to explain the differentials in employment rates between the non-disabled and disabled. 
The analyses are performed for samples before and after the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
of 1990.  The results from studies of the Survey of Income Program Participation (SIPP) of 1984, 1990, 
1996 and 2001 indicate that the employment and wage gaps between the disabled and the non-disabled 
have risen sharply over time, both before and after the passage of the ADA.  Most of the rise prior to the 
ADA was attributable to arise in differences that cannot be explained with measurable factors.  Nearly all 
of  the  rise  in  the  gaps  in  the  1990s,  however,  is  attributable  to  factors  that  can  be  measured.  The 
unexplained differential has held relatively constant during that period.  
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1. Introduction 
 
On July 26, 1990, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was legislated to protect the civil 
rights of persons with disabilities. The ADA was expected to increase the employment and wages 
of people with disabilities. Although the anti-discriminatory law was enacted to ensure equality of 
opportunity for persons with disabilities, promote their economic self-sufficiency, and encourage 
independent living, researchers find that the ADA had little impact on the labor market 
experience of individuals with disabilities, or a slight negative effect on their employment 
opportunities. The raw data from Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP hereafter) 
shown in figures 1 and 2 also indicate that since the introduction of the ADA relative 
socioeconomic status of the disabled has worsened in terms of earnings and employment 
participation. In particular, the difference in employment participation between non-disabled and 
disabled has significantly increased after the ADA (Figure 1). Moreover, although the decline of 
relative wages between 1984 and 2001 is not as significant as the relative employment, it is 
evident that workers with disabilities face a larger hourly wage gap after the ADA than before 
(Figure 2). These data do not control for the difference in average individual characteristics 
between the non-disabled and the disabled. The emphasis in this paper is to examine how much 
of the declines can be explained by measurable factors and how much by unexplained 
differentials.      
Several empirical studies (DeLeire 2000, 2001; Acemoglu and Angrist 2001; Beegle and 
Stock 2003) investigate how the ADA affects the labor market experience of the disabled. In 
terms of the employment rate, DeLeire (2000) and Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) find that the 
ADA contributes to an increase in the unemployment rate of the disabled. In contrast, Beegle and 
Stock (2003) consider various state-level antidiscrimination laws prior to the ADA and present 
new evidence on the effects of disability discrimination laws. They find that disability 
discrimination laws are associated with lower relative earnings of the disabled, with slightly   3 
lower labor force participation rates among the disabled, but the laws are not associated with 
lower relative employment rates for the disabled once they control for pre-existing employment 
trends among the disabled. There is some research on wage differentials between individuals with 
disabilities and ones without disabilities in the U.S. labor market. Schumacher and Baldwin 
(2000) find an increase in wage differential between people with and without disabilities between 
1990 and 1993. On the other hand, Moon and Shin (2006) show that estimated effects of the 
ADA on dollar-valued well-being measures (i.e., wages and total personal income) of men with 
disabilities are sensitive to the measurement of disability in use. The ADA effects on dollar-
valued well-being measures of disabled men are found to be larger and more statistically 
significant for objective measures than for a self-reported measure of disability.    
A fundamental assumption underlying the ADA is that disabled individuals retain low 
economic status in part due to discrimination in the labor market and lack of access to 
employment opportunities. While many researchers (Johnson and Lambrinos 1985, Baldwin and 
Johnson 1994, 2000) examine the labor market experience of persons with disabilities with 
emphasis on the discrimination perspective, few studies attempt to evaluate the impact of the 
ADA from the discrimination perspective. DeLeire (2001) finds that the discriminatory 
component of the wage gap did not fall after the introduction of the ADA, but the study has not 
paid attention to the impact of the ADA on employment participation of the disabled.  
There are several contributions of this study. First, I contribute to the literature on the 
impact of the ADA with direct analyses on the changes in unexplained differentials 
(discrimination and the residual effects) for the disabled in terms of both employment rates and 
wage differentials. Second, I apply a newly suggested decomposition methodology by Neuman 
and Oaxaca (2004) that can be applied to decompose the actual wage differentials when the 
Heckman sample selection model is utilized. Third, this study includes a broader time period 
before and after the ADA. I use information from the SIPP 1984, 1990, 1996, and 2001, allowing   4 
comparisons to cover a longer time span before and after the passage of the ADA.
2 Finally, 
disability may be a socially acceptable and convenient rationalization of absence from the labor 
market. Accordingly the literature has been concerned about „justification bias‟ or the 
endogeneity of self-assessed health measures. I utilize relatively more objective measures of 
disability in this study.  
The results shown here are different from the results of previous studies on the impact of the 
ADA on the labor market performance of the disabled. Consistent with previous work, I also find 
that there was no improvement in both employment opportunities and the wage for the disabled 
even after the introduction of the anti-discriminatory law. However, in the decomposition 
analyses where I control for a number of characteristics of the non-disabled and disabled, I find 
interesting results not found by the previous studies. Although the unexplained differentials for 
employment rates between the non-disabled and disabled had increased, there are no significant 
changes in the relative portion of the unexplained components over time. Furthermore, although I 
do not find an apparent decline in the unexplained portion of the wage gap, the relative portion of 
the unexplained components has significantly narrowed in the post-ADA. If the negative 
productivity effects of poor health on labor market performance have not changed over time, the 
ADA was successful to the extent in reducing wage discrimination against people with 
disabilities in the U.S. labor market.     
 
2. Econometric Framework 
 
This study focuses on explaining how observed and unobserved factors affect the differentials in 
employment opportunities and earnings between the non-disabled and the disabled. Using the 
Heckman sample selection model, I estimate both labor supply and wage equations for the two 
                                                 
2 Previous studies allowed insufficient time periods in the evaluation of the ADA. For example, DeLeire 
(2001) utilized SIPP 1984 and 1993 to evaluate the impact of the ADA on the changes in wage 
discrimination against people with disabilities.    5 
groups with data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (1984, 1990, 1996, and 
2001). Since there is a selection correction term in the Hackit model, it is inappropriate to use the 
decomposition methods that have been commonly applied to estimate the extent of 
discrimination.
3 In this paper, a newly suggested decomposition method (Neuman and Oaxaca, 
2004), which is applicable to the wage decomposition of selectivity-corrected wage equations, is 
applied to divide the total wage gap into the explained and unexplained components
4. Along with 
the estimation of unexplained components of wage differentials for the disability, I investigate 
changes in the impact of unexplained components on differences in employment opportunities 
before and after the ADA.  
 
2.1 Estimating Employment Participation and Wage  
 
The wages earned by employed workers (the observed wages) are biased measures of the wages 
receiving by all labor force participants because some of the influences on wages also determine 
whether or not individuals participate in the labor force. The bias may be substantial in the 
estimation of earnings functions for persons with disabilities because many disabled persons are 
not employed. Heckman‟s sample selection model can correct for this bias in the earning 
functions. I, therefore, use the model to estimate the wage and employment status coefficients of 
both non-disabled and disabled.  
Let us first consider probit equations which are the first step in the Heckit model. I follow 
the traditional labor force participation model in assuming that an individual decides upon 
whether or not to enter the labor market on the basis of a comparison between the employer‟s 
                                                 
3 However, while most of the previous studies applied a traditional decomposition method to decompose 
the selection corrected wage differentials into the explained and unexplained differentials (discrimination 
and residual components), I decompose the actual wage differential by applying a new decomposition 
technique.  
4 In the discrimination articles, people normally call the unexplained part „discrimination‟, which is not 
explained by the difference of characteristic variables between groups.    6 
wage offer and his or her reservation wage. There is a large differential in the employment 
participation rates between the non-disabled and the disabled. The low employment participation 
of the disabled could be due to in part to high reservation wages associated with certain types of 
disability as a consequence of disability income transfers and the extra demands on time and 
energy required to participate in the labor force. Low employment rates might also be due to low 
market wage rates offered to the disabled as a consequence of lower levels of productivity and/or 
employer discrimination (Kruse and Schur, 2003).  To examine the relationship between offer 
and reservation wage, we begin with the specification of the human capital-based wage offer 
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Z incorporates human capital variables as well as factors influencing the value 
of time (for example, presence of children, level of exogenous income, and difficulties of moving 
about with a disability.). We do not directly observe the reservation wage, which is a latent 
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Zij. The labor force participation (employment) equation is estimated 
by a probit specification. 
There are two distinct purposes in the estimation of the probit model. First, it estimates 
the bias correction term / selectivity variable that corrects for sample selection bias. Second, using 
the method suggested by Even and McPherson (1990), it enables the difference between average 
employment rates for the two groups to be decomposed into those attributable to differences in 
human capital related characteristics and those related to unexplained components.  
Most explanatory variables in probit equations are included in the wage equations as 
well. However, in order to estimate an economically valid correction term, we need exclusion 
restrictions. I use non-labor income and various family structures in the employment decision 
equation and exclude them from the wage equation. This assumes that those variables play a role 
in determining whether individuals participate in the labor force or not, but do not directly affect 
the wages of workers. For example, it seems reasonable to assume that the presence of children 
and positive spouse‟s earnings are far more likely to influence whether a person enters the labor 
force than it is to influence the offered wage after they have entered.
5  
  The Heckman two-stage procedure is adopted. The probit estimates on the employment 
decision are used to create the selectivity variable (inverse Mills ratio),

, which is then included 
as an additional regressor in the wage equation which is estimated by OLS. Consequently, the 
sample selection corrected wage equation may be written as follows: 
                                                 
5 Kidd et al. (2000) and Baldwin and Johnson (2000) used exogenous income and nonwage income and 
three marital status dummies for exclusion restrictions, respectively. According to Pencavel (1986), a 
married man with his spouse present is much more likely to be in the labor force than a man with a 




O  I  0   jXij jij 
where 
j u j j     , 

ij   jHij     jHij  , and      is the standard normal density function. 
These parameters are estimated for both the non-disabled and the disabled group. The sample 
selection variable corrects the bias that is caused by the absence of information on offered wages 
to non-workers. For this lambda, the previous studies (Baldwin 1992, 1994, 2000, Kidd et al. 
2000, and Jones et al. 2006) on the labor market discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities have not applied an appropriate decomposition technique. However, Neuman and 
Oaxaca (2004) suggest a decomposition method which can be applicable under some conditions 
when the bias correction term is included in the wage equation.
6 The details are discussed in 
Section 2.3.  
 
2.2 Estimating the Unexplained Causes of Employment Differentials 
 
The results in the first step are used to measure the extent to which unobserved factors influence 
the difference in employment rates for disabled and non-disabled workers. However, the common 
decomposition methods to be used in estimating wage discrimination cannot be implemented for 
the probit model because of the non-linearity. Even and McPherson (1990) suggest a method that 
enables the difference between the average participation rate for the two groups to be 
decomposed into that attributable to differences in human capital related characteristics and the 
unexplained component. The unexplained residual combines the extent to which the disabled face 
discrimination and also the extent to which there are unmeasured aspects of productivity. 
                                                 
6 Neuman  and  Oaxaca  (2004)  suggest  three  different  decompositions  under  several  relatively  strong 
assumptions.  Although  none  of  those  present  authoritatively  identifies  the  “correct”  decomposition,  it 
might be better to apply one of the methods to estimate discrimination, considering our different situations.    9 
  The details of the two equation probit method are as follows. Define non-disabled 
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The corresponding measure of the gap explained by the difference between non-disabled and 
disabled measured characteristics (EXP) is: 
(7)  
























  Even and McPherson‟s suggestion is an application of Oaxaca (1973)‟s wage 
decomposition for a continuous variable applied to probit model. The advantage of this method is 
that it allows us to control for non-disabled/disabled differences in education, experience, health 
conditions, family structures, level of unearned income, and all measured factors likely to be 
correlated with the tendency to participate in employment. However, given the possibility of 
omitted variables, in particular the extent and severity of the disability and its impact on labor 
productivity in the current setting, the usual caveat applies in interpreting the residual component. 
The unexplained component is likely to reflect the role of uncaptured differences in tastes and 
productivity in addition to the possibility of employment discrimination. Furthermore, we need an 
additional assumption that measured characteristics are determined exogenously without being 
affected by the disabilities. For instance, if poor health conditions discourage the disabled from 
attaining higher education, we will confront identification problems in our decomposition of 
employment differentials into the explained and unexplained components.  
   10 
2.3 Estimating Unexplained Components in Wage Differentials 
 
To measure the extent of wage discrimination against people with disabilities, we need to choose 
among various decomposition techniques. Beginning with the simple decomposition technique 
developed by Oaxaca (1973), there are several versions of decomposition methods (Cotton, 1988; 
Neumark, 1988; Oaxaca and Ransom, 1994). There has always been a divergence from the initial 
decomposition method, since there has been disagreement about what constitutes the 
nondiscriminatory wage structure. Among several alternatives, we would choose a decomposition 
method suggested by Neuman and Oaxaca (2004). Their method divides the total wage 
differential into the explained and unexplained portion when the Heckit model is used for wage 
equations. In that methodology, we assume that the nondiscriminatory wage structure is the 
observed wage structure for non-disabled men. This choice is reasonable because men with 
disabilities are a small fraction of the employed labor force.  
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8 Equation (8) states that the 
gross wage differential is the sum of the wage difference in offer wages that is attributable to the 
                                                 
7 In  Neuman  and  Oaxaca  (2004),  several  methods  to  deal  with  the  selection  bias  correction  term  are 
suggested. Among a few alternatives, we would choose the most encompassing way to view discrimination. 
This  suggestion  is  to  regard  both  difference  in    parameters  from  the  probit  selection  equation  for 
employment  and  differences  in  the  wage  effects  of  selectivity  (  )  as  manifestations  of  discrimination. 
Differences in the values of the employment determining variables (
' H ) between the disabled and the non-
disabled would be treated as nondiscriminatory endowment effects. The first assumption has been claimed 
by several previous researchers (see Baldwin and Johnson, 1992, 1994, and 2000 for the details) , and the 
second one is also normally assumed in the discrimination literature. In regards to the last assumption,  I 
assume that labor market discrimination does not affect the employment determining variables.    11 
part of the unexplained differentials (discrimination and residual effects) and the wage differential 
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d nd nd      in the 
first and second brackets respectively are the key parts that allow us to do the correct 
decomposition when the lambda, selectivity correction term, is included in the wage equations.
9  
 
3. Definition of Disability and Data 
 
There is no single commonly accepted, straightforward definition of disability. Different 
researchers define disability in various ways because it is a fairly subjective issue. However, it is 
an important step to define disability at the beginning of each of the disability studies since the 
disabled population rates are not only quite different depending on the definition, but also the 
definition may influence the results of studies and how they are interpreted.   
There are two main ways to determine the existence of a disability from survey data. 
First, a disability can be self-assessed. In data sources like the National Health Interview Survey 
(NHIS), Current Population Survey (CPS), and the Survey of Income and Program Participation 
(SIPP), an individual assesses his/her own condition, and whether the condition affects the 
capacity to undertake work, without any reference to outside standards. For example, the 2001 
SIPP includes questions such as “Do you have a physical, mental, or health condition that limits 
the kind and amount of work you can do?” Although this type of question has the advantage of 
asking for direct information on work ability and is extensively used in labor market analysis 
                                                                                                                                                 
8 In order to check how equation (8) has been derived and alternative decomposition methods, see Neuman 
and Oaxaca (2004). 
9 When the selectivity correction term is not dealt appropriately, the  estimation of wage  decomposition 
would be biased. Since this new method has been suggested recently, most  of previous studies (Baldwin 
and Johnson, 1992, 1994 and 2000; Kidd et al., 2000; Jones et al., 2006) decomposed the sample selection 
bias adjusted wage differentials in lieu of the actual wage differentials. In case of DeLeire (2001), he 
applied Tobit model to estimate the wage equations so that he could avoid encountering having the inverse 
Mills ratio. However, it is well known that Tobit model results in biased estimates.      12 
(Kidd et al., 2000, Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001, and DeLeire, 2000), it is subjective and there 
may be social and economic incentives to misreport disability status (Bound, 1991 and Currie, 
1999). Second, empirical studies use self-reported information on specific heath conditions or 
more objective measures of health. Although such observations are less likely to suffer from the 
bias of disability reporting, the information on disability tends not to be as closely related to 
limitations on work and thus suffers from measurement errors (Bound, 1991).
10 Among the 
various measures as described in Jones (2005), I use self-reported functional limitations to define 
the disabled group in this study.  
The SIPP increased the number of questionnaire terms relevant to health conditions as the 
survey continued from 1984 through 2001. In this paper, I evaluate labor market performance of 
individuals with disabilities before and after the ADA. To be consistent with the definition of 
disability across time, I need to rely on common questions. The 1984 SIPP, which includes the 
least number of functional limitation questions, is used as the lowest common denominator. Table 
1 displays the list of questions that are used to define disabilities in this study. I define an 
individual to have a disability if the respondent answers „yes‟ to at least one of the questions 
regarding sensory disability, physical disability, or activity limitation.  
The four different cross sectional data from the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation 1984, 1990, 1996, and 2001 are used in this study to estimate the impact of the ADA 
on the labor market experience of individuals with disabilities. The core questionnaire provides 
detailed information on the respondents‟ income sources, demographic characteristics, and 
participation in various cash and non-cash benefit programs for each individual in every month. 
The topical module that supplements each core file collects different information in each wave so 
that I merge the topical module that includes information on functional limitations with core files. 
The notable difference between SIPP and other survey data is that it includes both detailed 
                                                 
10 I admit that although the functional limitations are highly correlated with self-reported work limitations, 
we cannot guarantee that those with functional limitations report the work limitations, vice versa.     13 
information on health-related characteristics and socioeconomic status. Considering the timing of 
the passage of the ADA and the timing of the collection of the SIPP surveys, we can definitely 
use SIPP 1984 to reflect the labor market prior to the ADA, and both SIPP 1996 and SIPP 2001 
to evaluate the labor market in the post-ADA period. However, we need to be careful how we 
interpret the results from SIPP 1990. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was legislated 
in 1990 to protect the civil rights of persons with disabilities. After enactment in 1990, the ADA 
covered employers with 25 or more employees starting in 1992, and employers with 15 or more 
employees starting in 1994. The issue is whether the markets might have changed in anticipation 
of the adoption of the ADA during 1990 before the law is legally effective.
11 Since this is difficult 
to determine, it is preferable to say that SIPP 1990 reflects a market that is in the process of 
adapting to the new law.    
I restrict the sample to the men between the ages of 18 and 62 who are not enrolled in 
school to avoid gender discrimination effects and the restrictions focus only on individuals who 
are at working age. As the SIPP contains different sample units across years, the total number of 
observations varies. I define employment participation if the individual is an employee with a 
positive wage for the reference month (Figure 1 and Table 2). The hourly pay variable for 
Equation (5) is based on usual weekly pay divided by usual hours (Figure 2 and Table 3). After 
creating the hourly wage rates, I drop workers whose hourly earnings are either less than 2 or 
more than 200 dollars among those employed for the reference month.  
The detailed definitions of explanatory variables used in this study are presented in 
Appendix 1. I apply the usual Mincer measure to infer labor market experience (maximum 
potential experience) as age – years of education – 5. Particularly, for those without a high school 
degree, I assume that they enter the labor force at age 17. I also incorporate dummies indicating 
the different level of educations. In addition, dummies are included for health status in both 
                                                 
11 Ransom and Oaxaca (2005) provide an example for the possibility that people can change their behavior 
even before the enactment of the ADA.    14 
employment participation and wage equations. Occupation and industry variables are included in 
the wage equations.  
As explained in the previous section, we need exclusion restrictions to correct for the 
selection bias in wage equations. Unearned income and various family structure variables are 
included in the employment equation but excluded from the wage equation. These are expected to 
influence the reservation wages, but not the offered wages. Finally, while dummy variables for 
union membership and part-time work status are included in wage equations, they cannot be 
included in the employment equations because such information is unavailable for those who are 
not employed. 
 
4. Estimation Results 
 
Tables 2 and 3 provide summary statistics of all the major variables used in the empirical analysis 
for employment participation and wage equations. As shown in Figure 3, according to the 
definition of disability in this paper, the percentage recorded as disabled has fallen by two or 
three percentage points from a starting value of around 12 percent in 1984 to slightly less than 10 
percent in 2001.
12 Employment participation rates rose from 76.6 percent for the non-disabled 
men in 1984 to 85.2 percent in 1996 before declining by 3 percentage points by 2001 (Table 2). 
For people with disabilities, employment rates have consistently decreased from 56 percent to 
41percent so that the differences in employment rates between the non-disabled and disabled 
have increased from 21 percentage points to 41 percentage points over the study period (Figure 
                                                 
12 In contrast with the U.S. results, Jones et al. (2006) found that the percentage of disabled in the UK has 
increased by six or seven percentage points over the period 1997-2004. However, we should be careful to 
compare results across different studies because as previously mentioned each study applies a different 
criterion to define disability. They defined disabled as individuals who have a self-reported long-term 
illness (12 months or more).      15 
1).
13 This is an indication of a possible negative effect from the ADA that is also noted in other 
studies (DeLeire, 2000 and Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001).  
  In 1984 the hourly earnings of those with disabilities was 93.9 percent of the wage for the 
non-disabled. The relative hourly pay of the disabled decreased to 93 percent in 1990, 86.9 
percent in 1996, before rising to 90.4 percent in 2001 (Figure 2). On the basis of these raw means, 
the evidence seems to suggest that the relative position of the disabled has moved in a negative 
direction in terms of both wages and employment opportunities since the introduction of the 
ADA.  
However, the raw data do not control for individual characteristics. It is necessary to 
implement more sophisticated analyses to estimate the real impact of the ADA, controlling for the 
difference in individual characteristics between the non-disabled and the disabled.       
   It is also worth noting several important differences in the means of other explanatory 
variables. The non-disabled on average have higher educational attainments than the disabled. 
However, the non-disabled have shorter labor market experience, because disability tends to be 
associated potentially with age.
14 In Table 3, we compare the difference between non-disabled 
and disabled in terms of the distributions of occupation and industry. The disabled are under-
represented relative to the non-disabled in the high paying managerial and professional 
occupations and over-represented in manual occupations, which is one explanation for their lower 
wage levels. However, we do not find notable differences in the employment shares in each of 
industry between the groups.
15 Moreover, the disabled are more likely to be employed part-time 
than the non-disabled. Both groups show increases in the proportion of part-time workers after 
                                                 
13 It should be noted that these results depend on the definition of disability and definition of employment 
status in this study.  
14 The measurement error issue relevant with using potential experience as a proxy for labor market 
experience is probably larger for the disabled group because they are more likely to have had absences 
from the labor market for their poor health conditions. See Regan and Oaxaca (forthcoming) for more 
discussion regarding the measurement error issue in potential experience and its implication for wage 
decomposition.    
15 More sophisticated analysis will be carried out in the Section 4.3 regarding the comparison of the 
occupation distributions for the two groups.    16 
the enactment of the ADA. In line with expectations, a higher proportion of disabled workers 
self-report their health status as fair or poor rather than better health conditions. Finally, while 
there is no significant change in the amount of nonwage income among the non-disabled across 
different time periods, the unearned income for the disabled has increased from $300 in 1984 to 
$693 per month in 2001.
16 I conjecture that more recipients of disability program benefits after 
the ADA could be a possible reason for this appearance.  
Equation (4) and (5) are estimated for non-disabled and disabled group for four cross 
sectional data sets, before and after the ADA, to evaluate the impact of the Act on the U.S. labor 
market. Table 4 presents estimation results for employment participation, which are selection 
equations in the Heckman model. The regression results of wage equations for each of the groups 
are displayed in Table 5. The explanatory variables such as educational attainments, experience, 
and health conditions are anticipated to influence both offer wages and reservation wage. Using 
the estimation results from the Heckman sample selection model, we do decomposition analysis 
as presented in equations (6) and (7) for employment differentials and in equation (8) for wage 
differentials between the non-disabled and the disabled (Tables 6 and 7).  
 
4.1. Employment Participation Equations 
 
The employment participation probit estimates are provided in Table 4. In all cases, Likelihood 
Ratio tests unambiguously reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients in each regression are 
jointly insignificant. Turning to the coefficient estimates, most findings are in accordance with 
expectations. For both the non-disabled and the disabled, higher education attainment increases 
                                                 
16 Although unearned income has not been adjusted for the inflation rate, we can find that it increased 
relatively faster among disabled than non-disabled. In addition, it also increased much faster than the 
increase of hourly pay for the same period. As presented in estimation results in Table 5, the nonwage 
variable is the most critical factor in explaining the employment participation decision regardless of 
disability status. In that sense, higher unearned income was supposed to increase the reservation wage and 
this would affect the increase of the unemployment of the disabled.     17 
the probability of being employed. However, the marginal effect of each education variable is 
stronger for the disabled, indicating the particular importance of obtaining higher education 
among the disabled. There are also strong experience effects, with positive and negative signs on 
the linear and quadratic terms, respectively observed in all cases. Whites are more likely to be 
employed, while unmarried males are less likely to be employed than those with dependents 
without spousal earnings (the omitted group). As shown in the results, unearned income has 
pronounced negative effects on labor force participation. In theory non-wage income increases 
reservation wages, regardless of health status. People who report better health are more likely to 
be employed as expected.
17  
 
4.2. Sample Selection Corrected Wage Equations 
 
In general, it seems that earnings are determined in a similar fashion for disabled and non-
disabled workers (Table 4 and 5). Similarly with the results in probit regressions, F tests reject the 
null hypothesis that all the coefficients are zero. Moreover, the overall fit of the wage 
specification is relatively good with R-squareds ranging from .24 to .41.  
The potential maximum experience and education variables
18 make significant positive 
contributions to higher wages for both the disabled and non-disabled persons. Although a few 
coefficients for those variables are statistically insignificant at a traditional significance level for 
the disabled group, the signs of coefficients are still consistent with usual predictions. Whites and 
union members typically earn more, while part-time workers have lower hourly earnings.  
Relative to service occupation (omitted group), all of the other jobs except “laborer” pay 
better wages. In particular, individuals in the professional and managerial occupations receive the 
                                                 
17We may have to be careful with this interpretation. As many studies issued, unemployed individuals may 
report poor health conditions to justify their work status. Furthermore, responses may not be independent of 
the labor market effects we want them to explain. For example, it is possible that health conditions can be 
deteriorated when unemployed.   
18 Those who attain high school degree are used as a comparison group.   18 
highest earnings. The industry dummies have a fairly consistent effect across the sub-groups, with 
higher wages given the omitted group (agriculture, forestry, and fisheries). Although both 
occupation and industry dummies provide significant explanatory power for both groups with a 
similar pattern, these variables do not provide good explanations for the variation of wage levels 
among people with disabilities in the 2001 SIPP. More interesting transition is found in the 
coefficients of industry and occupation dummies regardless of disability status. The magnitudes 
of the coefficients decrease with a few exceptions and loose explanatory power in recent survey 
years. It is also worthwhile to note that self-reported health conditions have pronounced effects 
on wages for both the non-disabled and the disabled, although several are not statistically 
significant. Workers who self-reported worse health earned lower incomes, although many 
coefficients of health status for those with disabilities are statistically insignificant.  
Sample selection into employment does not have  substantial effects on the earnings of the 
disabled. The sample selection correction parameter in the earning functions is statistically 
insignificant for the disabled workers in every sample except the one in 1984.
19 Given that most 
of the coefficients of the selection correction term are statistically insignificant, the results are 
little affected by whether or not a correction is made for sample selectivity.  
 
4.3. Decomposition Results of the Differentials in Employment and Earnings 
 
Tables 6 and 7 represent the set of decomposition results for both the employment and the wage 
differentials. Equations (6) and (7) outline the probit decomposition of Even and McPherson 
(1990). The gaps of employment participation between the non-disabled and the disabled have 
increased over time. The main question addressed by this research is to what extent the 
employment participation rate differential is due to unexplained components (discrimination and 
                                                 
19 This result is inconsistent with Baldwin and Johnson (1994), which utilizes the same data, SIPP 1984, in 
their analysis. They report a significant negative lambda coefficient for the non-disabled implying that not-
employed men with above average wage offers have more valuable opportunities outside the labor force.    19 
the residual effects) and productivity related characteristics. Although the difference in 
employment participation between the two groups has increased over the period 1984-2001, the 
reasons for the rise vary for different time periods. 
Between 1984 and 1990, the year the ADA was adopted, the gap in employment left 
unexplained after controlling for the factors in the regression analysis, has risen markedly from 
6.5 percent in 1986 to over 14.9 percent in 1990.  This rise explains most of the overall difference 
in employment levels between the two groups.  After 1990, however, the unexplained differential 
does not show a rise, as it stayed at 14.4 percent in 1996, and again in 2001. 
The primary reason for the rise in the total employment gap after 1990 is explained by an 
increase in the difference in employment explained by differences in the mean characteristics of 
the disabled and non-disabled.  After rise from only 14.2 to 15.2 percent between 1984 and 1990, 
the explained differential in employment rose to 26.9 percent in 1996 and stayed at roughly that 
same level (26.1%) in 2001. 
Thus, it appears that between 1984 and the passage of the ADA most of the rise in 
employment differentials between the disabled and the non-disabled was explained by a rise in 
the unexplained differential.  After the passage of the ADA, the employment differential 
continued to rise, but for a different reason.  Either due to differences in employers' hiring 
practices after the ADA or other changes during the 1990s, the increase in the employment 
differential was driven more by an increase in the measured differences between the disabled and 
the non-disabled. 
The set of decomposition results of wage differentials in Tables 6 and 7 come from applying 
the decomposition method suggested by Neuman and Oaxaca (2004). Standard errors for the 
estimates of decompositions are calculated via the bootstrap method. Let us first focus on the 
wage differences between two sub-groups shown in raw data and how they have changed. 
Average hourly wages in 1984 are $10.62 for non-disabled men and $9.97 for men with   20 
disabilities. Both groups experienced hourly pay increase as time goes by. However, the nominal 
wage difference between the non-disabled and the disabled has increased over time.  
Contrary to the decomposition results regarding employment differences, the wage 
decomposition analysis in Tables 6 and 7 indicates that there has been a significant change in 
wage differences attributed to between-group differences in productivity-related characteristics 
and an unexplained portion which is discrimination and residual effects. The unexplained 
components of the log wage differential has not risen so dramatically, as it has risen  from .037 in 
1984 to .055 in 1990, fallen  to .039 in 1996, and risen again to .052 in 2001. If the relative 
unobserved productivity of the disabled who obtained jobs has not changed over time, it does not 
appear that the extent of wage discrimination in 2001 is any worse than it was in 1990 just as the 
ADA was being passed, although it may have been worse than in 1984 and 1996.  
 In 1984 when the overall differential in wages was low at 3.7 percent, the decomposition of 
the wage shows that the entire differential is attributable to the unexplained differential.  By 1990 
the wage differential had risen to 6.5 percent in 1990s, but by that point a slightly smaller 
percentage of the differential, 85 percent, was attributable to the unexplained component.  By 
1996, six years after the ADA was passed, the wage differential had risen to 9.1 percent, largely 
due to a rise in differences between the disabled and non-disabled that can be explained with 
measureable characteristics.  The explained differential rose to 5.2 percent, while the unexplained 
difference fell back to 3.9 percent.  Thus the unexplained differential by 1996 accounted for only 
43 percent of the overall differential.   Between 1996 and 2001 the overall wage differential rose 
again to 11.4 percent, this time because both the unexplained and the explained differential both 
increased.  As a result, the unexplained differential accounted for 46 percent of the overall 
differential.   
The results show that the gap between the disabled and the non-disabled increased sharply 
both for the probability of being employed and for the wage paid between 1990 the year that the 
ADA was passed and 1996 and 2001.  In both cases nearly all of the rise in the differential is   21 
attributable to a sharp increase in the segment of the gap that can be attributed to factors that can 
be measured.  This result is partly consistent with the British study conducted by Jones et al, 
(2006).  It is also somewhat consistent with the ADA evaluation by DeLeire in 2001, who argues 
that the ADA was unsuccessful at preventing discrimination.  The unexplained differential has 
not fallen since 1990 for employment and fell temporarily only in 1996 before rising again to the 
1990 level in 2001.       
Table 6 also decomposes the explained component of wage differentials into sub-
components.
20 While the negative contributions of labor market experience to the explained wage 
differentials has narrowed, the effects of education do not show a significant change in transition. 
Regarding experience, the relative average age of the disabled men has decreased (Table 3), and 
the coefficient values on experience variable decreased (Table 5). These two changes both led to 
a decrease in the explained differential attributable to experience to -.0826 in 1990, -.0628 in 
1996, and -.0471 in 2001.  
The results also suggest that occupation and health condition differences play a major role in 
earning differences between the non-disabled and disabled. Difference in occupations and health 
conditions help explain why the wage differential is so large. The non-disabled tend to be in 
higher paying occupations, which explain .027 in the log wage differential between the non-
disabled and disabled in Table 6 in 1984, 1990, and 2001, and .024 of the differential in 1996. 
The non-disabled also tend to have better health, which contributes to explaining .0299 of the log 
wage differential in 1984. Tables 2 and 3 show that the number of disabled persons reporting fair 
or poor health has risen relative to the number of non-disabled persons with fair or poor health in 
Tables 2 and 3. The increase in poor health among the disabled relative to the non-disabled is one 
                                                 
20 As shown in Oaxaca and Ransom (1999), the estimated separate contribution to the unexplained portion 
of the wage decomposition causes the identification problems. The estimates are not invariant with respect 
to the choice of reference groups, and a similar identification problem applies to continuous variables.    22 
of the reasons why the log wage differential explained by the difference in health rises to .0357 in 
1990, 0.0483 in 1996, and .0418 in 2001.
 21   
The last two rows in Tables 6 and 7 represent the decomposition of wage differentials into the 
explained and unexplained differentials without controlling for occupation and industry variables. 
This should provide important checks because the disabled may choose certain occupations and 
industries, either voluntarily or involuntarily, which they would not choose unless they are 
disabled. Mullay and Sindelar (1992) report that alcohol dependence reduces the probability that 
a man is in a management, administrative, and technical or professional occupation. These are the 
highest paying jobs. 
 Previous studies did not attempt to examine the effects of self-selection in the choice of 
occupation and industry among the disabled. If workers with disabilities involuntarily settle for 
specific occupations because of labor market discrimination, the estimate of the unexplained 
wage differentials should be underestimated.  Prior to the implementation of decomposition 
analysis without occupation and industry dummies, it is worth investigating how much 
occupation dissimilarity exists between the non-disabled and the disabled. The distribution of the 
non-disabled and disabled men across occupations is reported in Table 3. Occupations in the 
labor market are somewhat segregated. In 1984, for example, whereas workers without 
disabilities are relatively more likely to hold professional jobs, ones with disabilities are more 
likely to work in semi-skilled jobs. A convenient way to summarize the level of segregation is to 
use the dissimilarity index,

D. This index is widely attributed to Duncan and Duncan (1955), who 
described some of its properties. Using the Duncan index, the trend in occupation dissimilarities 
                                                 
21 The results are somewhat consistent with previous studies. DeLeire (2001) finds that the detrimental 
effect of health on earnings did decline among the work-limited disabled over the period 1984-93, but no 
significant changes among the only functionally limited disabled.      23 
in the U.S. is .14, .12, .10, and .10 in 1984, 1990, 1996, and 2001, respectively.
22 Interestingly the 
inequality of occupation distributions was improved in post-ADA. As expected, the percentage of 
the unexplained differential is larger than when occupation and industry are controlled, but the 
difference is not at a significant level. More importantly, the unexplained differentials have still 
decreased before and after the ADA.  
As noted above, in terms of the actual differences in wage and employment between the non-
disabled and the disabled, individuals with disabilities by 2001 were much less likely to be 
employed relative to non-disabled people than they were in 1984.  The disabled who had jobs 
also experienced a larger gap in their earnings relative to the non-disabled. Based on 
decomposition analysis, non-trivial portions of both employment and wage differentials are 
attributable to the unexplained components. The unexplained components are somewhat difficult 
to interpret in the current context. Although we attempted to control for the impact of poor health 
upon productivity by including self-assessed health status in our analysis, it is difficult to 
adequately control for the impact of disability upon productivity. However, if we assume that the 
effects of unobservable health characteristics on the unexplained differential are constant across 
different time period, we may be able to interpret the unexplained components in the traditional 
manner. Although the ADA prohibits employees from discriminating in employment against 
individuals with disabilities, we do not find any improvements in employment opportunities 
among the disabled after the introduction of the ADA. On the other hand, a significant 
improvement was found in the reduction of the unexplained wage differential.     
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ndis the proportion of all non-disabled men in job 

i. The dissimilarity index is bounded 
between 0 and 1. Proportional representation of non-disabled and disabled in all job categories would yield 
a value 1. 

D has a convenient interpretation – it is equal to the fraction of the disabled (or the non-disabled) 
that would have to change occupations in order for the proportions of the non-disabled and the disabled in 
each occupation to be equal.    24 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this analysis I made several adjustments to earlier work in the field.  First, I applied an 
alternative definition of disability which is more objective compared to other studies. Second, I 
decomposed the actual employment and wage differentials using a newly suggested 
decomposition technique to deal with the selection correction term, in lieu of the selection bias 
adjusted wage differential. Finally, I evaluated the impact of the ADA by utilizing a longer period 
of sample 1984 to 2001.  
Between 1984 and 1990, the year in which the ADA was established, the gap in employment 
rates between the non-disabled and the disabled rose 50 percent from 20.8 percent to 30.2 
percent.  Meanwhile, the gap in wages nearly doubled from 3.7 percent to 6.6 percent.  In both 
cases, nearly all of the rise in the gap was attributable to a rise in factors that were not measured 
in the analysis.  To the extent that unmeasured features of productivity did not change during this 
period, the rise in the gap might be attributable to an increase in discrimination against the 
disabled that is unrelated to productivity differences. 
From the passage of the ADA in 1990 through 1996 and on to 2001 the gap in employment 
rates and wages between the non-disabled and the disabled rose further.  The employment 
probability gap rose another 50 percentage points from 30.2 percent to 40.6 percent, and the wage 
gap nearly doubled again from 6.6 percent to 11.4 percent.  This change, however, was not due to 
a rise in the unexplained differential.  During the period the ADA has been in force, therefore, the 
increase is primarily attributable to differences that are based on measurable factors.    
In deciding how to discuss these findings with respect to the timing of the passage of the 
ADA, it is important to interpret the unexplained differentials carefully.  Some component of the 
unexplained differential could be due to discrimination against the disabled that is not related to 
their productivity in the workplace.   However, the fact of the disability typically places obstacles 
to productivity for the disabled that are not easy to quantify, so the extent of economic   25 
discrimination measured by the unexplained differential might be smaller than in the case of 
racial or gender discrimination.  In this paper, I included self-reported health status to control for 
the productivity difference between the non-disabled and the disabled.  Even so, the included 
variables may still be insufficient to control for the productivity difference. The results that I have 
described might be interpreted as upper bounds within which the true measure of employment 
and wage discrimination is likely to fall. 
  The ADA appears to have been associated with a halt in the rise of unexplained 
differences, a part of which might be economic discrimination, in the 1990s.  But the disabled 
apparently still face increasing challenges based on measurable factors that have led to an 
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Figure 1: Comparison of Employment Participation between Non-disabled 
and Disabled 
 
Note: data sources from SIPP 1984, 1990, 1996, and 2001. 
 
Figure 2: Comparison of Wage Rate between Non-disabled and Disabled 
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Figure 3: Disability Rates in the U.S. 1984 - 2001 
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Table 1: Disability Quesionnaire from the 1984 SIPP  
Sensory disability 
Does … have any difficulty seeing words and letters in ordinary newspaper print even when wearing glasses or contact lenses if … usually wears 
them? 
Does … have any difficulty hearing what is said in a normal conversation with another person? 
Does … have any trouble having his/her speech understood? 
Physical disability 
Does … have any difficulty lifting and carrying something as heavy as 10 lbs., such as a full bag of groceries? 
Does … have any difficulty walking for a quarter of a mile - about 3 city blocks? 
Does … have any difficulty walking up a flight of stairs without resting? 
Activity limitation: ADL (activities of daily living) 
Does … need help from others in looking after personal need such as dressing, undressing, eating or personal hygiene? 
Does … have any difficulty getting around inside the house by yourself? 
Does … have any difficulty getting into and out of bed by yourself? 
Activity limitation: IADL (instrumental activities of daily living) 
Does … have any difficulty getting around outside the house by yourself? 
Because of your health, does … need help to do light housework such as washing dishes, straightening up, or light cleaning? 
Does … need help to prepare meals for yourself? 
Note: SIPP data have included additional questions relevant to personal health status as they come to more recent data. Hence we should be based on 












Table 2: Summary Statistics for Variables in Employment Participation Equations 
   Non-disabled  Disabled 
Variables  1984  1990  1996  2001     1984  1990  1996  2001 
Employed  0.766  0.836  0.852  0.819    0.556  0.530  0.437  0.411 
  (0.0038)  (0.0033)  (0.0026)  (0.0031)    (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.012) 
Experience  16.55  16.80  18.44  19.03    27.20  26.07  27.79  27.98 
  (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.085)  (0.095)    (0.31)  (0.30)  (0.25)  (0.28) 
Experience squared  4.255  4.191  4.724  5.048    9.103  8.329  9.060  9.136 
  (0.046)  (0.043)  (0.035)  (0.040)    (0.16)  (0.15)  (0.13)  (0.14) 
HS dropouts  0.157  0.141  0.122  0.120    0.394  0.309  0.284  0.235 
  (0.0033)  (0.0031)  (0.0024)  (0.0026)    (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.0098)  (0.010) 
High school  0.371  0.355  0.339  0.331    0.355  0.376  0.367  0.383 
  (0.0043)  (0.0043)  (0.0035)  (0.0037)    (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.010)  (0.012) 
Some college  0.241  0.245  0.297  0.295    0.153  0.185  0.251  0.275 
  (0.0038)  (0.0039)  (0.0034)  (0.0036)    (0.0086)  (0.0095)  (0.0094)  (0.011) 
College  0.231  0.259  0.242  0.254    0.0973  0.130  0.0981  0.107 
  (0.0038)  (0.0039)  (0.0032)  (0.0034)    (0.0071)  (0.0083)  (0.0065)  (0.0075) 
White  0.871  0.850  0.844  0.828    0.856  0.835  0.801  0.793 
  (0.0030)  (0.0032)  (0.0027)  (0.0030)    (0.0084)  (0.0091)  (0.0087)  (0.0098) 
Nonwage  1.071  1.377  1.369  1.593    3.001  4.168  5.809  6.932 
  (0.034)  (0.048)  (0.037)  (0.046)    (0.12)  (0.19)  (0.20)  (0.40) 
Marital 1  0.186  0.211  0.225  0.200    0.151  0.164  0.136  0.120 
  (0.0035)  (0.0037)  (0.0031)  (0.0032)    (0.0086)  (0.0091)  (0.0075)  (0.0079) 
Marital 2  0.179  0.126  0.119  0.121    0.163  0.109  0.0815  0.0816 
  (0.0034)  (0.0030)  (0.0024)  (0.0026)    (0.0089)  (0.0077)  (0.0060)  (0.0066) 
Marital 3  0.133  0.159  0.167  0.159    0.178  0.183  0.197  0.212 
  (0.0030)  (0.0033)  (0.0027)  (0.0029)    (0.0092)  (0.0095)  (0.0087)  (0.0099) 
Marital 4  0.106  0.0761  0.0740  0.0822    0.223  0.160  0.153  0.124 
  (0.0028)  (0.0024)  (0.0019)  (0.0022)    (0.0100)  (0.0090)  (0.0078)  (0.0080) 
Marital 5  0.0847  0.0762  0.0810  0.0848    0.0461  0.0487  0.0460  0.0575 
  (0.0025)  (0.0024)  (0.0020)  (0.0022)    (0.0050)  (0.0053)  (0.0046)  (0.0056) 
Marital 6  0.311  0.352  0.334  0.354    0.239  0.335  0.386  0.404 
  (0.0042)  (0.0043)  (0.0035)  (0.0038)    (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.012) 
H Excellent  0.381  0.392  0.382  0.373    0.109  0.101  0.0597  0.0610 
  (0.0044)  (0.0044)  (0.0036)  (0.0038)    (0.0075)  (0.0074)  (0.0052)  (0.0058) 
H Very good  0.288  0.348  0.364  0.352    0.151  0.166  0.128  0.124 
  (0.0041)  (0.0043)  (0.0035)  (0.0038)    (0.0086)  (0.0091)  (0.0073)  (0.0080) 
H Good  0.200  0.217  0.215  0.231    0.263  0.299  0.259  0.263 
  (0.0036)  (0.0037)  (0.0030)  (0.0033)    (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.0095)  (0.011)   33 
H Fair  0.0399  0.0381  0.0339  0.0368    0.258  0.261  0.292  0.305 
  (0.0018)  (0.0017)  (0.0013)  (0.0015)    (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.0099)  (0.011) 
H poor  0.00387  0.00441  0.00537  0.00703    0.219  0.173  0.260  0.248 
  (0.00056)  (0.00059)  (0.00054)  (0.00066)    (0.0099)  (0.0093)  (0.0096)  (0.010) 
Observations  12,391  12,473  18,448  15,941     1,737  1,664  2,110  1,704 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for Variables in Wage Equations    
   Non-disabled  Disabled 
Variables  1984  1990  1996  2001     1984  1990  1996  2001 
Hourly wages  10.62  13.21  17.93  21.41    9.971  12.28  15.56  19.36 
  (0.074)  (0.088)  (0.14)  (0.19)    (0.19)  (0.28)  (0.36)  (0.77) 
Log of hourly wages  2.302  2.496  2.720  2.877    2.264  2.430  2.629  2.763 
  (0.0056)  (0.0055)  (0.0050)  (0.0056)    (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.020)  (0.025) 
Experience  16.61  17.13  18.66  19.28    24.85  23.96  25.38  26.41 
  (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.087)  (0.099)    (0.40)  (0.38)  (0.37)  (0.43) 
Experience squared  4.150  4.163  4.682  5.008    7.736  7.038  7.680  8.262 
  (0.050)  (0.045)  (0.037)  (0.042)    (0.20)  (0.19)  (0.18)  (0.21) 
HS dropouts  0.139  0.125  0.105  0.103    0.306  0.234  0.167  0.167 
  (0.0036)  (0.0032)  (0.0024)  (0.0027)    (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.014) 
High school  0.370  0.357  0.338  0.321    0.387  0.374  0.393  0.353 
  (0.0050)  (0.0047)  (0.0038)  (0.0041)    (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.018) 
Some college  0.242  0.241  0.299  0.303    0.182  0.224  0.302  0.320 
  (0.0044)  (0.0042)  (0.0037)  (0.0040)    (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.018) 
College  0.248  0.278  0.258  0.273    0.125  0.168  0.139  0.160 
  (0.0044)  (0.0044)  (0.0035)  (0.0039)    (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.011)  (0.014) 
Union  0.240  0.198  0.160  0.145    0.303  0.252  0.193  0.207 
  (0.0044)  (0.0039)  (0.0029)  (0.0031)    (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.015) 
White  0.887  0.861  0.859  0.847    0.893  0.900  0.869  0.847 
  (0.0032)  (0.0034)  (0.0028)  (0.0032)    (0.0099)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.014) 
Part time  0.0496  0.0743  0.192  0.190    0.0850  0.0839  0.280  0.316 
  (0.0022)  (0.0026)  (0.0031)  (0.0034)    (0.0090)  (0.0093)  (0.015)  (0.018) 
Professional  0.234  0.249  0.257  0.278    0.154  0.188  0.169  0.210 
  (0.0043)  (0.0042)  (0.0035)  (0.0039)    (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.015) 
Clerical  0.202  0.205  0.199  0.201    0.140  0.147  0.187  0.164 
  (0.0041)  (0.0040)  (0.0032)  (0.0035)    (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.014) 
Service  0.0986  0.104  0.106  0.114    0.101  0.109  0.114  0.136 
  (0.0031)  (0.0030)  (0.0025)  (0.0028)    (0.0097)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.013) 
Skilled  0.208  0.190  0.188  0.175    0.262  0.221  0.218  0.184 
  (0.0042)  (0.0038)  (0.0031)  (0.0033)    (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.015) 
Semi-skilled  0.165  0.159  0.156  0.137    0.231  0.217  0.210  0.204 
  (0.0038)  (0.0036)  (0.0029)  (0.0030)    (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.015) 
Labored  0.0928  0.0938  0.0952  0.0941    0.112  0.118  0.102  0.101 
  (0.0030)  (0.0029)  (0.0023)  (0.0026)    (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.0100)  (0.011) 
Farm  0.0198  0.0228  0.0255  0.0249    0.0332  0.0283  0.0217  0.0171 
  (0.0014)  (0.0015)  (0.0013)  (0.0014)    (0.0058)  (0.0056)  (0.0048)  (0.0049)   35 
Mining  0.0140  0.00921  0.00871  0.00804    0.0176  0.0181  0.0152  0.00857 
  (0.0012)  (0.00094)  (0.00074)  (0.00078)    (0.0042)  (0.0045)  (0.0040)  (0.0035) 
Construction  0.0875  0.0919  0.0941  0.103    0.0850  0.0952  0.0889  0.109 
  (0.0029)  (0.0028)  (0.0023)  (0.0027)    (0.0090)  (0.0099)  (0.0094)  (0.012) 
Manufacture  0.283  0.251  0.230  0.195    0.374  0.297  0.286  0.241 
  (0.0046)  (0.0042)  (0.0034)  (0.0035)    (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.016) 
Whole  0.0589  0.0559  0.0570  0.0509    0.0446  0.0465  0.0466  0.0371 
  (0.0024)  (0.0023)  (0.0018)  (0.0019)    (0.0066)  (0.0071)  (0.0069)  (0.0072) 
Retail  0.141  0.138  0.145  0.150    0.116  0.137  0.118  0.130 
  (0.0036)  (0.0034)  (0.0028)  (0.0031)    (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.013) 
Finance  0.0439  0.0458  0.0419  0.0467    0.0290  0.0306  0.0293  0.0343 
  (0.0021)  (0.0020)  (0.0016)  (0.0018)    (0.0054)  (0.0058)  (0.0056)  (0.0069) 
Utility  0.0425  0.0381  0.0343  0.0332    0.0456  0.0340  0.0434  0.0129 
  (0.0021)  (0.0019)  (0.0015)  (0.0016)    (0.0067)  (0.0061)  (0.0067)  (0.0043) 
Transportation  0.0591  0.0687  0.0613  0.0607    0.0622  0.0714  0.0824  0.0729 
  (0.0024)  (0.0025)  (0.0019)  (0.0021)    (0.0078)  (0.0087)  (0.0091)  (0.0098) 
Service  0.187  0.215  0.232  0.258    0.140  0.189  0.208  0.269 
  (0.0040)  (0.0040)  (0.0034)  (0.0038)    (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.017) 
Government  0.0633  0.0633  0.0682  0.0692    0.0528  0.0522  0.0564  0.0686 
  (0.0025)  (0.0024)  (0.0020)  (0.0022)    (0.0072)  (0.0075)  (0.0076)  (0.0096) 
H Excellent  0.422  0.396  0.384  0.387    0.149  0.145  0.110  0.111 
  (0.0051)  (0.0048)  (0.0039)  (0.0043)    (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.010)  (0.012) 
H Very good  0.322  0.357  0.378  0.364    0.226  0.249  0.217  0.217 
  (0.0048)  (0.0047)  (0.0039)  (0.0042)    (0.013)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.016) 
H Good  0.213  0.213  0.210  0.221    0.326  0.363  0.350  0.364 
  (0.0042)  (0.0040)  (0.0032)  (0.0036)    (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.018) 
H Fair  0.0364  0.0324  0.0257  0.0259    0.230  0.178  0.257  0.236 
  (0.0019)  (0.0017)  (0.0013)  (0.0014)    (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.016) 
H poor  0.00211  0.00182  0.00216  0.00214    0.0684  0.0646  0.0662  0.0714 
  (0.00047)  (0.00042)  (0.00037)  (0.00040)    (0.0081)  (0.0083)  (0.0082)  (0.0097) 
Observations  9489  10424  15724  13054    965  882  922  700 
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Table 4: Probit Regressions 
Dependent variable: Dummy = 1 if a person is in the employment participation 
   Non-disabled  Disabled 
Variables  1984  1990  1996  2001     1984  1990  1996  2001 
Experience  0.0455***  0.0804***  0.0714***  0.0676***    0.0210*  0.0573***  0.0261**  0.0112 
  (0.0045)  (0.0045)  (0.0040)  (0.0041)    (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.013) 
Experience squared  -0.0925***  -0.180***  -0.154***  -0.139***    -0.0515**  -0.139***  -0.0654***  -0.0158 
  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.0094)  (0.0096)    (0.025)  (0.026)  (0.024)  (0.027) 
HS dropouts  -0.151***  -0.270***  -0.341***  -0.193***    -0.295***  -0.0511  -0.485***  -0.192** 
  (0.039)  (0.042)  (0.037)  (0.039)    (0.083)  (0.088)  (0.083)  (0.094) 
Some college  0.00222  -0.0193  0.0215  0.153***    0.176  0.235**  0.0892  0.259*** 
  (0.036)  (0.038)  (0.031)  (0.032)    (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.082)  (0.088) 
College  0.0725*  0.235***  0.226***  0.237***    0.209  0.368***  0.280**  0.455*** 
  (0.038)  (0.041)  (0.037)  (0.036)    (0.14)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.13) 
White  0.219***  0.213***  0.325***  0.356***    0.274***  0.380***  0.428***  0.224** 
  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.031)  (0.031)    (0.10)  (0.099)  (0.083)  (0.088) 
Nonwage  -0.0609***  -0.0427***  -0.0629***  -0.0490***    -0.116***  -0.0597***  -0.0609***  -0.0566*** 
  (0.0034)  (0.0022)  (0.0024)  (0.0020)    (0.0084)  (0.0045)  (0.0046)  (0.0045) 
Marital 1  0.568***  0.127**  0.0206  0.0330    0.180  -0.0572  0.0961  -0.125 
  (0.051)  (0.059)  (0.052)  (0.053)    (0.13)  (0.15)  (0.14)  (0.16) 
Marital 3  0.519***  0.131**  0.0720  0.0460    0.186  0.115  0.180  -0.0280 
  (0.056)  (0.063)  (0.056)  (0.056)    (0.13)  (0.15)  (0.14)  (0.15) 
Marital 4  -0.161***  -0.155**  -0.145**  -0.264***    0.0794  0.0578  0.117  -0.203 
  (0.054)  (0.072)  (0.063)  (0.061)    (0.13)  (0.16)  (0.15)  (0.16) 
Marital 5  -0.240***  -0.468***  -0.529***  -0.428***    -0.678***  -0.729***  -0.142  -0.427** 
  (0.059)  (0.068)  (0.059)  (0.060)    (0.19)  (0.20)  (0.19)  (0.19) 
Marital 6  -0.112***  -0.288***  -0.419***  -0.354***    -0.531***  -0.619***  -0.489***  -0.555*** 
  (0.042)  (0.053)  (0.047)  (0.047)    (0.12)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.13) 
H Excellent  0.881***  0.122***  0.0958***  0.265***    0.0628  0.144  0.404***  0.348** 
  (0.034)  (0.040)  (0.034)  (0.034)    (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.15)  (0.16) 
H Very good  0.859***  0.128***  0.191***  0.177***    0.367***  0.434***  0.266**  0.291** 
  (0.036)  (0.040)  (0.034)  (0.033)    (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.12) 
H Fair  0.378***  -0.291***  -0.536***  -0.503***    -0.367***  -0.574***  -0.438***  -0.570*** 
  (0.066)  (0.071)  (0.061)  (0.061)    (0.094)  (0.093)  (0.081)  (0.089) 
H Poor  -0.300  -1.181***  -1.310***  -1.319***    -1.222***  -1.104***  -1.303***  -1.325*** 
  (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.14)  (0.14)    (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.098)  (0.11) 
Constant  -0.318***  0.394***  0.502***  0.187***    0.598***  0.0923  0.234  0.355 
  (0.069)  (0.079)  (0.070)  (0.070)    (0.21)  (0.22)  (0.21)  (0.22) 
                     37 
Observations  12391  12473  18448  15941    1737  1664  2110  1704 
Log likelihood  -5646  -4769  -6433  -6393    -817.6  -804.7  -991.4  -836.6 
LR chi2  2198  1606  2579  2296    751.3  691.4  908.6  634.5 
Pseudo R-squared  0.163  0.144  0.167  0.152     0.315  0.301  0.314  0.275 
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Table 5: Selectivity Corrected Wage Equations 
Dependent variable: log of hourly wage rate 
   Non-disabled  Disabled 
Variables  1984  1990  1996  2001    1984  1990  1996  2001 
Experience  0.0418***  0.0360***  0.0316***  0.0345***     0.0331***  0.0320***  0.0245***  0.0174** 
  (0.0016)  (0.0020)  (0.0018)  (0.0020)    (0.0047)  (0.0058)  (0.0068)  (0.0086) 
Experience squared  -0.0691***  -0.0568***  -0.0498***  -0.0611***    -0.0494***  -0.0481***  -0.0338**  -0.0253 
  (0.0037)  (0.0046)  (0.0042)  (0.0046)    (0.0096)  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.017) 
HS dropouts  -0.113***  -0.122***  -0.137***  -0.109***    -0.128***  -0.118***  -0.0593  -0.147** 
  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.018)    (0.034)  (0.040)  (0.052)  (0.068) 
Some college  0.0768***  0.0635***  0.0907***  0.113***    0.0828**  0.140***  0.100**  0.0183 
  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.013)    (0.040)  (0.041)  (0.043)  (0.057) 
College  0.287***  0.298***  0.349***  0.394***    0.185***  0.298***  0.277***  0.392*** 
  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.015)    (0.055)  (0.054)  (0.064)  (0.086) 
Union  0.163***  0.212***  0.192***  0.172***    0.213***  0.252***  0.238***  0.318*** 
  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.014)    (0.031)  (0.036)  (0.046)  (0.059) 
White  0.127***  0.115***  0.0741***  0.0953***    0.0953**  0.0638  0.0274  0.0843 
  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.014)    (0.044)  (0.051)  (0.053)  (0.064) 
Part time  -0.140***  -0.105***  -0.0428***  -0.0232*    -0.165***  -0.111*  -0.0591  -0.0754 
  (0.020)  (0.017)  (0.011)  (0.013)    (0.049)  (0.057)  (0.039)  (0.050) 
Professional  0.336***  0.347***  0.347***  0.327***    0.335***  0.406***  0.390***  0.185** 
  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.019)    (0.063)  (0.065)  (0.074)  (0.092) 
Clerical  0.170***  0.182***  0.163***  0.165***    0.154***  0.270***  0.178***  0.0191 
  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.019)    (0.059)  (0.061)  (0.069)  (0.085) 
Skilled  0.149***  0.174***  0.174***  0.131***    0.182***  0.220***  0.225***  -0.0281 
  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.020)    (0.054)  (0.060)  (0.069)  (0.089) 
Semi-skilled  0.0361*  -0.00496  0.0508***  0.00116    -0.0238  0.0163  -0.00175  -0.110 
  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.021)    (0.056)  (0.061)  (0.070)  (0.087) 
Labored  -0.0181  -0.0312  -0.00489  -0.0104    -0.0501  -0.0230  0.0202  -0.184* 
  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.023)    (0.063)  (0.067)  (0.079)  (0.100) 
Mining  0.376***  0.319***  0.287***  0.220***    0.585***  0.470***  0.216  0.181 
  (0.049)  (0.053)  (0.053)  (0.062)    (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.18)  (0.30) 
Construction  0.289***  0.256***  0.197***  0.190***    0.332***  0.370***  0.135  -0.0506 
  (0.035)  (0.033)  (0.030)  (0.035)    (0.089)  (0.10)  (0.13)  (0.19) 
Manufacture  0.321***  0.330***  0.242***  0.195***    0.402***  0.361***  0.225*  0.0318 
  (0.034)  (0.031)  (0.028)  (0.034)    (0.081)  (0.097)  (0.12)  (0.18) 
Whole  0.250***  0.244***  0.232***  0.184***    0.372***  0.343***  0.163  -0.0734 
  (0.037)  (0.035)  (0.032)  (0.039)    (0.100)  (0.11)  (0.14)  (0.21) 
Retail  0.115***  0.119***  0.0480*  0.000413    0.133  0.151  -0.0268  -0.196   39 
  (0.034)  (0.032)  (0.029)  (0.035)    (0.086)  (0.10)  (0.12)  (0.19) 
Finance  0.311***  0.333***  0.286***  0.207***    0.325***  0.295**  0.305**  -0.0189 
  (0.039)  (0.036)  (0.034)  (0.040)    (0.11)  (0.13)  (0.15)  (0.22) 
Utility  0.358***  0.351***  0.289***  0.251***    0.326***  0.397***  0.329**  -0.0832 
  (0.039)  (0.037)  (0.036)  (0.042)    (0.099)  (0.12)  (0.14)  (0.27) 
Transportation  0.312***  0.258***  0.235***  0.177***    0.361***  0.407***  0.225*  -0.0805 
  (0.037)  (0.034)  (0.032)  (0.038)    (0.094)  (0.11)  (0.13)  (0.20) 
Service  0.102***  0.153***  0.118***  0.0683**    0.180**  0.141  -0.00132  -0.192 
  (0.034)  (0.032)  (0.029)  (0.034)    (0.086)  (0.099)  (0.12)  (0.19) 
Government  0.226***  0.289***  0.261***  0.181***    0.198**  0.409***  0.190  -0.0269 
  (0.037)  (0.035)  (0.032)  (0.038)    (0.098)  (0.11)  (0.14)  (0.20) 
H Excellent  0.0602***  0.0724***  0.0913***  0.0591***    0.0563  0.0954**  0.130**  0.137* 
  (0.016)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.014)    (0.043)  (0.046)  (0.061)  (0.079) 
H Very good  0.0464***  0.0410***  0.0517***  0.0305**    0.0554  0.0870**  0.0442  0.149** 
  (0.016)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.013)    (0.037)  (0.039)  (0.048)  (0.062) 
H Fair  -0.0462*  -0.0676***  -0.0541*  -0.0654**    -0.0729*  -0.0722  -0.103**  -0.00582 
  (0.025)  (0.026)  (0.029)  (0.033)    (0.038)  (0.046)  (0.047)  (0.066) 
H Poor  -0.00158  -0.0526  -0.0373  -0.105    -0.0822  -0.0691  -0.336***  -0.0977 
  (0.095)  (0.10)  (0.094)  (0.11)    (0.065)  (0.069)  (0.090)  (0.11) 
Inverse Mill's ratio  -0.00945  -0.0157  -0.0270  -0.00664    -0.134***  0.0207  -0.00905  -0.0882 
  (0.028)  (0.037)  (0.036)  (0.037)    (0.045)  (0.042)  (0.059)  (0.072) 
Constant  1.257***  1.472***  1.788***  1.982***    1.340***  1.355***  1.898***  2.466*** 
  (0.048)  (0.045)  (0.042)  (0.050)    (0.12)  (0.14)  (0.16)  (0.23) 
                   
Observations  9489  10424  15724  13054    965  882  922  700 
Log likelihood  -5192  -5978  -12200  -10583    -490.2  -491.5  -676.5  -595.7 
F test  237.4  258.4  235.8  186.1    22.90  22.85  12.97  9.067 
Adj R-squared  0.411  0.409  0.295  0.284     0.389  0.410  0.267  0.244 
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Table 6: Decomposition of Employment and Wage Differentials   
   1984  1990  1996  2001 
Employment differentials 
Employment - non-disabled  0.766  0.836  0.852  0.819 
Employment - disabled  0.556  0.53  0.437  0.411 
Employment differential  0.2079  0.3018  0.4134  0.4057 
                 
Decomposition of employment differentials 
Explained differential  0.1428  (0.0155)  0.1524  (0.0124)  0.2691  (0.0131)  0.2616  (0.0124) 
Unexplained differential  0.0651  (0.0179)  0.1494  (0.0161)  0.1442  (0.0156)  0.1441  (0.0153) 
                 
Wage differentials 
Hourly wage - non-disabled  $10.62  $13.21  $17.93  $21.41 
Hourly wage - disabled  $9.97  $12.28  $15.56  $19.36 
Wage Differential   $0.65  $0.93  $2.37  $2.05 
                 
Decomposition of wage differentials 
Log Wage Differential  0.0373  0.0657  0.0910  0.1141 
Explained differential  0.0001  (0.0149)  0.0100  (0.0126)  0.0520  (0.0139)  0.0619  (0.0157) 
Unexplained differential  0.0372  (0.0172)  0.0557  (0.0170)  0.0390  (0.0198)  0.0522  (0.0234) 
                 
Components of the explained wage differentials 
Experience  -0.0970  (0.0066)  -0.0826  (0.0056)  -0.0628  (0.0051)  -0.0471  (0.0053) 
Education   0.0587  (0.0051)  0.0472  (0.0050)  0.0501  (0.0051)  0.0494  (0.0064) 
Occupations  0.0270  (0.0041)  0.0272  (0.0044)  0.0243  (0.0041)  0.0272  (0.0051) 
Industry  -0.0136  (0.0037)  -0.0036  (0.0034)  -0.0089  (0.0032)  -0.0028  (0.0034) 
Health conditions  0.0299  (0.0101)  0.0357  (0.0085)  0.0483  (0.0102)  0.0418  (0.0121) 
Others  -0.0060  (0.0032)  -0.0150  (0.0039)  -0.0033  (0.0033)  -0.0077  (0.0037) 
Lambda  0.0011  (0.0039)  0.0012  (0.0049)  0.0043  (0.0067)  0.0012  (0.0086) 
                 
Decomposition of wage differentials without controlling for occupation and industry 
Explained differential  -0.0071  (0.0125)  0.0039  (0.0145)  0.0581  (0.0138)  0.0582  (0.0149) 
Unexplained differential  0.0444  (0.0166)  0.0618  (0.0176)  0.0329  (0.0236)  0.0559  (0.0275) 
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Table 7: Decomposition of Employment and Wage Differentials: Percentage Changes 
   1984  1990  1996  2001 
         
Employment differential  0.2079  0.3018  0.4134  0.4057 
Explained differential  0.142(69%)  0.152 (50%)  0.269 (65%)  0.261 (64%) 
Unexplained differential  0.065 (31%)  0.149 (50%)  0.144 (35%)  0.144 (36%) 
         
Log Wage Differential  0.0373  0.0657  0.0910  0.1141 
Explained differential  0.000 (0%)  0.010 (15%)  0.052 (57%)  0.0619 (54%) 
Unexplained differential  0.037 (100%)  0.055 (85%)  0.039 (43%)  0.0521 (46%) 
Total Differential         
Decomposition of wage differentials without controlling for occupation and industry 
Explained differential  -0.0071 (-19%)  0.0039 (6%)  0.0581 (64%)  0.0582 (51%) 




















Appendix 1: Variable Names and Definitions 
Variables  Definitions 
Dependent variables 
Log of hourly wages   Monthly earned income divided by (usual hours worked per week)*4 
Employment participation  Dummy variable equal to 1 if individual has a positive hourly wage, 0 else 
Human capital variables 
Experience  Potential labor market experience (age - years of education - 5) 
Exp squared  Experience squared / 100 
HS dropouts  High school dropouts 
High School  High school graduates (omitted group) 
Some College  More than high school degree, but less than 4 year college degree 
College   4 year college degree or above 
Occupation variables 
Clerical  Clerical occupations 
Professional  Professional / managerial occupations 
Service  Service occupations (omitted group) 
Skilled  Technical occupations 
Semi-skilled  Operative occupations 
Labored  Laborer 
Industry variables 
Farm  Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries  (omitted group) 
Mining  Mining 
Construction  Contruction 
Manufacture  Manufacturing 
Whole  Wholesale trade 
Retail  Retail trade 
Finance  Finance, insurance, and real estate 
Utility  Public utility 
Transportation  Transportation, communications, and other public utilities 
Service  Services 
Government  Public administration 
Self-reported health status 
H Excellent  Excellent health status 
H Very good  Very good health status 
H Good  Good health status (omitted group) 
H Fair  Fair health status 
H Bad  Bad health status 
Exclusion restrictions 
Nonwage  Monthly unearned income / 100 
Marital 1  Married, kids under age 18, and positive spouse earnings 
Marital 2  Married, kids under age 18, and no spouse earnings 
Marital 3  Married, no kids under age 18, and positive spouse earnings (omitted group) 
Marital 4  Married, no kids under age 18, and no spouse earnings 
Marital 5  Single with kids under age 18 
Marital 6  Single without kids under age 18 
Other variables 
White  Dummy variable denoting ethnic group, equals 1 if white 
Union  Dummy variable denoting union members, equals 1 if union member 
Part-time 
Dummy variable denoting part-time workers, equals 1 if work hours per week is less 
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